Plausible deniability with Bitmessage #690

New Issue

2014-07-20T16:54:31+02:00

F1k commented

2014-07-20 16:54:31 +02:00

(Migrated from github.com)

My first post here, I'm sorry if I do something not according to the rules here.

I have a problem with plausible deniability regarding Bitmessage.

I see all keys etc are stored in the same way as Bitcoin does. This is good and bad for plausible deniability.
Both BItcoin and Bitmessage use broadcasting messages over the network to 'spread the word'. I think I have figured out a way to positively identify what IP-address belongs to what transaction in Bitcoin, and suppose I could apply the same techniques to identify what IP belongs to what sender in Bitmessage. If I can do this, anyone can. (currently testing the application in a lab, will report later)

The issue I have is that it is possible for people to learn that the IP of my home computer is connected to my public key. If I understand Bitmessage correctly, everyone can see to what public key a message is addressed, but only the holder(s) of the corresponding private key can read the message.

scenario:
One could therefore find out that I, Robbie, am messaging with a known evil person using Bitmessage, let's name him Jim. Even though I message Jim a lot, I also message my contacts Paul and Emma a lot.

Something happens, Jim is involved, and they go through his contacts. Assuming Issue #267 is implemented, they would not be able to see what messages Jim received. They would be able to see that I messaged Jim a lot.

Next stop, they knock on my door.

As I only have one pool of keys, when I want to show that "I have never been involved with Jim" unlocking my client is not going to be an option

What I would like is the option to load specific keys using the (G)UI of the application.

(I'm not going to change my keys.dat file in /user/library/application support/PyBitmessage/ every time I want to message another contact. The UI can do this for me tho.)

I would like a simple option to open a keypair on any storage device connected to my computer. I can use one key per contact or contactset and simply load in the keypair from my encrypted storage whenever I want to check for messages.

This way, when I get raided over something one of my contacts did, I can claim someone must have broken into my wifi and abused it, as I do not have access to the keys they are looking for.

My first post here, I'm sorry if I do something not according to the rules here. I have a problem with plausible deniability regarding Bitmessage. I see all keys etc are stored in the same way as Bitcoin does. This is good and bad for plausible deniability. Both BItcoin and Bitmessage use broadcasting messages over the network to 'spread the word'. I think I have figured out a way to positively identify what IP-address belongs to what transaction in Bitcoin, and suppose I could apply the same techniques to identify what IP belongs to what sender in Bitmessage. If I can do this, anyone can. (currently testing the application in a lab, will report later) The issue I have is that it is possible for people to learn that the IP of my home computer is connected to my public key. If I understand Bitmessage correctly, everyone can see to what public key a message is addressed, but only the holder(s) of the corresponding private key can read the message. # scenario: One could therefore find out that I, Robbie, am messaging with a known evil person using Bitmessage, let's name him Jim. Even though I message Jim a lot, I also message my contacts Paul and Emma a lot. Something happens, Jim is involved, and they go through his contacts. Assuming Issue #267 is implemented, they would not be able to see what messages Jim received. They would be able to see that I messaged Jim a lot. Next stop, they knock on my door. As I only have one pool of keys, when I want to show that "I have never been involved with Jim" unlocking my client is not going to be an option # What I would like is the option to load specific keys using the (G)UI of the application. (I'm not going to change my keys.dat file in /user/library/application support/PyBitmessage/ every time I want to message another contact. The UI can do this for me tho.) I would like a simple option to open a keypair on any storage device connected to my computer. I can use one key per contact or contactset and simply load in the keypair from my encrypted storage whenever I want to check for messages. This way, when I get raided over something one of my contacts did, I can claim someone must have broken into my wifi and abused it, as I do not have access to the keys they are looking for.

PeterSurda commented

2015-11-12 00:13:48 +01:00

(Migrated from github.com)

The issue is, at the moment if you don't have a key loaded when you receive a message, it will be ignored forever even if you load the key afterwards. So it would need a bit more work. But in general I think having more key sources is desirable.

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Reference: Bitmessage/PyBitmessage-2025-02-22#690